Asian Americans, Political Organizations, and Participation in Chicago Electoral Precincts by Pelissero, John P. et al.
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Political Science: Faculty Publications and Other
Works Faculty Publications
7-2000
Asian Americans, Political Organizations, and
Participation in Chicago Electoral Precincts
John P. Pelissero
Loyola University Chicago, jpeliss@luc.edu
Timothy B. Krebs
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Shannon Jenkins
Loyola University Chicago
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political
Science: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact
ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
John P. Pelissero, Timothy B. Krebs, and Shannon Jenkins. "Asian Americans, Political Organizations, and Participation in Chicago
Electoral Precincts" Urban Affairs Review Vol 35 (2000): 750-769.
ASIAN-AMERICANS, POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
PARTICIPATION IN CHICAGO 
ELECTORAL PRECINCTS 
JOHN P. PELISSERO 
Loyola University Chicago 
TIMOTHY B. KREBS 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro 
SHANNON JENKINS 
Loyola University Chicago 
Precinct-level data for voter registration and turnout in Chicago elections are used to assess the 
impact of the Asian population and party organization on political participation during the 
1990s. Controlling for the effects of newer immigration, mobility, and socioeconomic status, the 
authors learn that larger Asian-American populations are associated with higher voter registra-
tion. Voter turnout is negatively affected in areas of higher Asian populations but attenuates 
when independent precincts are examined separately from machine-style precincts. This sug-
gests that registration may be encouraged in Asian areas, but voting appears to be negatively 
affected by political party organizations. 
Since 1965, when Congress reformed the nation's immigration laws, new-
comers from Asia have arrived in the United States in great numbers (Kitano 
and Daniels 1988, 16-17). There are more than 7 million Asian Americans in 
the United States, most of whom immigrated during the 1980s, a decade that 
witnessed the largest immigration to the United States since the 1920s. 
According to the 1990 census, Chicago was among the top three locations in 
the United States of intended residence for Asians (U.S. Department of Com-
merce 1992, Tables 6 and 11). Although we generally do not think of Chicago 
as a particularly important setting for Asian politics, it is something of a 
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magnet for Asian immigrants. The purpose of this study is to assess the politi-
cal behavior of Asian-Americans in the city of Chicago during the 1990s by 
looking at two aspects of political life: voter registration and voter turnout. 
Our interest is in knowing what effect Asian-Americans may have had on 
participation and how that may be shaped by the presence of enduring politi-
cal party organizations in many Chicago wards. 
The research on Asian-Americans and political organizations is important 
for a number of reasons. First, we examine the political behavior of an ethnic 
group that, until now, has received very little attention in the participation lit-
erature (for exceptions, see Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Cain, Kiewiet, 
and Uhlaner 1991; Lien 1997). Second, we examine Asian-American partici-
pation at the municipal level, where party organizations exerted strong influ-
ence over patterns of ethnic participation (Dahl 1961). The local political 
arena is important because it is here where most ethnic groups (especially 
newer arrivals) develop roots and achieve initial political successes (McClain 
and Stewart 1995, 34). Third, although much research on this ethnic group 
has been conducted in western cities (Nakanishi 1985-1986), we focus on a 
multiethnic midwestern city with a political culture (Elazar 1970; Kincaid 
1980) that places great emphasis on participation in city politics. It is also a 
city with ward-based party organizations that, in many instances, are still 
machine-like in their efficiency. 
Lacking individual-level survey databases, much of what we know about 
urban electorates comes from studies of particular racial and ethnic groups in 
the aggregate. In this article, we examine patterns of registration and turnout 
at the precinct level in Chicago's 50 wards. 
ETHNIC POLITICS IN CITIES 
For decades, scholars have used ethnicity to account for much of what 
goes on in urban politics (Wilson and Banfield 1964; Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 
1967). Wolfinger (1965) found that one's ethnicity is not an ephemeral influ-
ence on citizen participation but a more lasting element of one's political 
socialization. Empirical models support the notion of ethnic political culture. 
Nelson (1979) compared the influence of socioeconomic status and ethnicity 
on rates of participation among residents in New York City. He found signifi-
cant differences in participation among racial and ethnic groups, even after 
"controlling for socioeconomic status, age, sex, length of residence, assimi-
lation rates, and levels of ethnic consciousness" (p. 1035). 
Perhaps the most durable aspect of urban politics is the linkage between 
ethnicity and political coalition building. This is especially important in 
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Chicago, a multiethnic city with a history and enduring influence of 
machine-style politics. Machines thrived on the basis of their ability to mobi-
lize voters, ethnic or otherwise. According to Dahl (1961), machine leaders 
in New Haven used the spoils of office (patronage jobs, city contracts) to 
reward their multiethnic political coalition. In general, the rainbow coalition 
of ethnic interests that supported machine candidates was rewarded in rough 
proportion to their support at the ballot box. Via the strategy of ethnic inclu-
sion and voter mobilization of newer immigrants, machine organizations pla-
cated dissent and solidified their position among the electorate. Chicago has 
such a history, and many observers of Chicago's political development have 
held to the view that the machine reached out to all new residents to enlarge 
the Democratic Party voter base. From this perspective, ward organizations 
and their army of precinct captains registered new residents early to expand 
the Democratic Party voter base (Rakove 1975; Guterbock 1980). 
By contrast, Erie (1988) has argued that multiethnic coalitions were not 
the keys to machine strength (although exchange of patronage and votes was 
the essence of machine strength). He contended that machine organizations 
excluded from the coalition or demobilized certain ethnic groups once they 
had successfully constructed a minimum winning coalition. According to 
Erie, strong Irish machines (especially the one in Chicago) never controlled 
an amount of patronage to meet the potential demands of new immigrants (or 
claimants more generally), and what benefits they did control went princi-
pally to Irish supporters. A rational electoral strategy, therefore, involved 
ignoring those ethnic groups that arrived after the Irish, once electoral control 
was firmly established (see also Inglot and Pelissero 1993; Grimshaw 1992). 
This minimum winning coalition theory would have its greatest impact on 
newer arrivals or any potential new claimants on machine largesse, including 
Asian-Americans in Chicago. 
A third perspective on coalition building suggests that ward party organi-
zations (the workhorses of political machines) maximize registration and 
turnout for party candidates without regard to ethnic considerations in hopes 
that they will be rewarded by the officeholders they help elect. In Chicago, 
research has demonstrated a political dimension to service delivery. 
Mladenka's (1989) study of park services and, more recently, Miranda and 
Tunyavong's (1994) study of the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program and capital improvement allocations demonstrated that 
politics was important in this aspect of city government. Thus, regardless of 
the ethnic composition of the turnout, there are still material incentives for 
ward leaders to maximize support for favored candidates (particularly ones 
for mayor, who controls the city's budget process and bureaucracy). This is 
an increasingly important consideration for ward leaders in Chicago today in 
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light of their reduced ability to reward voters via patronage (Hamilton 1999). 
Unlike the rainbow theory of broad-based inclusion and Erie's (1988) selec-
tive mobilization hypothesis, the service delivery or political favoritism 
hypothesis suggests that ward-based party organizations compete with each 
other to demonstrate their political strength and to gain favor from the mayor 
and city bureaucracy. The goal is to outperform other ward organizations in 
delivering high pluralities in elections, thereby solidifying political favors for 
the ward. Protecting what one has gained in one's ward from incursions by 
newer claimants, such as Asian-Americans and other minority groups, is an 
important objective of the political favoritism motive and may lead to less 
coalition building by established groups (see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 
1997). 
ASIAN-AMERICANS AND CHICAGO POLITICS 
In contrast to what we know about the political behavior of older racial and 
ethnic groups such as African-Americans and Latinos, little is known about 
the participation of one of the nation's most recent immigrant groups: Asian-
Americans. What we do know is that Asian immigrants become naturalized 
citizens much earlier and in greater numbers than other immigrant groups 
(Barkan 1983). Given their initial ambition to enter the American main-
stream (Lien 1994) and high levels of group consciousness (Uhlaner, Cain, 
and Kiewiet 1989,211), we might expect Asian-Americans to be politically 
active as well. In general, however, research (centered almost exclusively in 
California) has shown that Asian-Americans participate at lower levels than 
other minority groups (Wong 1986; Lien 1997). This finding persists even 
when the socioeconomic status (SES) of the voter, a standard predictor of 
participation in national and local politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Oliver 1999), 
is controlled (Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Lien 1994). 
One explanation for this is that political activities are less important for 
Asians than securing citizenship status. Other explanations suggest that cul-
tural and linguistic barriers, as well as more basic concerns with economic 
stability, decrease the incentive (and time needed) for Asian-Americans to 
participate (Feng and Tang 1997,30). Two other factors may reduce Asian 
participation-naturalization time and frequent change of residences. 
Asian-Americans are a relatively new immigrant group. As a consequence, 
they are likely to be highly mobile and, therefore, less likely to participate in 
the political process (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). This might be espe-
cially pertinent in urban politics because many of the issues dealt with by city 
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governments affect individuals with a stake in the community (especially 
homeowners) and an interest in the policies that cities adopt (Oliver 1999, 
203; Thomas and Melkers 1999, 680). Because of differences in rates of 
assimilation, we might also expect precincts with greater numbers of Asians 
emigrating since the 1970s to have lower levels of turnout than those with 
more immigrants from earlier migrations. 
When looking at their participation in Chicago politics, we find that 
Asians have been hampered by a lack of focus on local affairs as well as an 
absence of unity in confronting local issues. The diversity of Chicago's Asian 
population has been an obstacle to achieving goals, I as members of one Asian 
subgroup are unwilling to support the causes and candidates from another 
Asian subgroup (Garza 1995). The Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
Commission 6n Civil Rights noted in a recent report that Asian-Americans 
need to "focus on issues confronting Asian Americans in the Chicago area, 
not on ethnic strife in their countries of origin" (Garza 1995,4) to be effective 
in the political system. Group-organizing efforts have been low, although the 
Asian American Institute of Chicago is trying to change that in anticipation 
of the 2000 census and redistricting. One of the unknowns about Asians and 
Chicago is the relationship between the established ward political organiza-
tions and Asian participation. 
To summarize, political participation is a function (in part) of individual 
and group factors. Better-educated and higher-income voters participate 
more regularly in the local political system because of high levels of efficacy 
and political interest (Alex-Assensoh 1997; Oliver 1999,202). Group sensi-
bilities and loyalties also affect participation rates. Group consciousness 
might propel individuals into the political realm, but often consciousness is 
articulated and advocated by entrepreneurial group leaders or political orga-
nizations. In Chicago, Democratic Party ward organizations still function at 
the grassroots, in some cases quite efficiently,2 to mobilize support for 
favored candidates. Although Asian voters (and, by extension, the subgroups 
that compose the Asian ethnic group) do not constitute a bloc of voters city-
wide that could swing elections one way or the other, their support may be 
crucial to election outcomes at the ward level where these groups are heavily 
concentrated. Furthermore, wards that deliver for successful mayoral candi-
dates may be in an advantaged position when it comes to neighborhood ser-
vices and improvements, a fact of political life in Chicago that may spur par-
ticipation among Asian voters. Chicago is a highly politicized town, unlike 
Los Angeles and California more generally, the settings for most studies of 
Asians. Thus we might find that Asian status does not hinder registration and 
turnout at the precinct level as much as the research on Asians suggests. Ward 
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organizations could affect this, perhaps in the direction of inclusive rainbow 
coalition building or perhaps in negative ways to minimize political claim-
ants or protect political favoritism in the allocation of jobs and services in 
wards. 
This overview makes it clear that many questions remain about the politi-
cal behavior of Asian-Americans, especially in urban settings such as Chi-
cago. First, do high percentages of new Asian immigrants within voting pre-
cincts depress voter registration and turnout in precincts generally? Second, 
how might the size of the Asian-American population within precincts affect 
overall levels of registration and turnout, compared to other racial or ethnic 
populations? Third, do observed patterns of participation among 
Asian-Americans hold when controlling for income, residential mobility 
rates, and size ~f the new immigrant population within electoral precincts? 
Finally, and perhaps most important, how does the presence of a strong politi-
cal organization in the ward shape Asian participation? These are the ques-
tions to which this inquiry is directed. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Based on this review, we expect variation in political participation-spe-
cifically, registration and turnout levels-to be related to racial/ethnic, socio-
economic, and political organizing factors. We also believe that participation 
levels will vary by residential mobility and the timing of when immigrants 
entered the United States. Our specific hypotheses are the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Precincts with larger Asian populations will have lower levels of 
participation. This will be especially true in precincts with larger populations 
of newer immigrant ethnic Asians, such as Asian Indians, Filipinos, Koreans, 
and Southeast Asians, rather than more established groups, such as Chinese 
and Japanese. 
Hypothesis 2: Voter registration will be lower in precincts with higher Asian popu-
lations, higher levels of residential mobility, and larger new immigrant popula-
tions. 
Hypothesis 3: Higher Asian populations will have a negative effect on pre-
cinct-level turnout after controlling for the effects of socioeconomic status and 
other predictors of participation. 
Hypothesis 4: Machine-style political organizations will have a negative effect on 
precinct-level participation by Asian populations. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
The setting for this study is Chicago, a city rich in ethnic and racial diver-
sity with a long history of machine- and ward-based politics. Chicago has 50 
wards used as the basis for representation on the city council and in the Dem-
ocratic and Republican Parties' central committees. Elections to these 
offices, as well as mayor, clerk, and treasurer, are held every four years, 
including 1991 and 1995, which are studied here.3 Our unit of analysis is the 
voting precinct. Each ward has between 38 and 65 electoral precincts, a num-
ber that varies across election years. We have 2,361 cases (precincts) for our 
1991 analysis and 1,968 for 1995.4 Our interest in Asians and political partic-
ipation was stimulated by their high immigration to the city between 1980 
and 1990 and ,the lack of study about the political effects of this growth. For 
example, the Asian population in Chicago grew 52.4% between 1980 and 
1990 and included major increases among newer Asian ethnic immigrants, 
such as Asian Indians (+46%), Filipinos (+23%), Koreans (+36%), and 
Southeast Asians (+70%). 
The dependent variables in this study are the following: (1) voter registra-
tion (percentage of voting-age residents registered to vote) in the municipal 
elections of 1991 and 1995 and (2) voter turnout (percentage of registered vot-
ers who took ballots) in the primary and general elections of 1991 and 1995. 
The data for these dependent variables were provided by the Chicago Board 
of Elections. The independent variables examined in this study are measures 
of race/ethnicity (black, Asian, Hispanic), socioeconomic status (income per 
capita), immigration (percentage foreign born who immigrated since 1980), 
and residential mobility (percentage who moved--changed residence-
since 1985) in these precincts. These data are from the 1990 u.S. Census of 
Population and Housing (STF3) and were aggregated from the census block 
level to the precinct level by the Social Policy Research Center, Northern Illi-
nois University. 
A final predictor included is political party organization strength in the pre-
cincts, based on Democratic ward organization power over time. Although 
Chicago's legendary machine has not functioned in a citywide capacity since 
the late 1970s, many wards continue to operate with powerful and efficient 
machine-style organizations. In 1991,20 wards still operated in machine-like 
fashion, 18 in 1995. These wards have successfully resisted the establishment 
of more independent and inclusive politics. Precincts were coded as (1) for 
machine-style party precincts or (0) for independent precincts. 
Two kinds of analysis are presented in this article. Basic descriptive infor-
mation is used to highlight the differences among racial and ethnic groups in 
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TABLE 1: Demographics and Political Participation in Chicago, 19905 
1990s City 1991 Precincts 1995 Precincts 
Population 2,783,726 2,377,365' 2,370,091b 
White, % (n) 37.9 ( 1,056,048) 49.2 49.7 
Black, % (n) 38.6 (1,074,471) 33.5 33.6 
Asian, % (n) 3.6 (98,777) 4.2 4.2 
Hispanic, % (n) 19.6 (545,852) 21.4 20.6 
Immigrated post-1980, % (n) 7.4 (207,075) 8.5 8.4 
Moved post-1985, % 49.3 48.5 48.5 
Income per capita $13,605 $13,838 $14,348 
Participation, % 
Registration 1991 81.5 76.0 
Registration 199? 81.0 72.7 
Turnout, % 
Primary 1991 47 48.5 
General 1991 45 46.5 
Primary 1995 40 40.4 
General 1995 42 43.0 
Precincts 1991, n 2,912 2,361 
Precincts 1995, n 2,454 1,968 
a. Precincts with incorrect registration data were dropped from the analysis for 1991. 
b. Precincts with incorrect registration data were dropped from the analysis for 1995. 
the city, including various Asian ethnic groups. Second, correlational and 
regression analyses are conducted to permit inferential conclusions about the 
effects of Asian populations and party organizations on political participa-
tion in Chicago. Importantly, we note that the analysis and conclusions are 
about precincts, not individuals. 
ANALYSIS 
Table 1 presents a basic description of Chicago's population and political 
participation rates. Because we had to exclude precincts with erroneous 
political participation records, we display in the final two columns of Table 1 
the actual descriptions of the precincts used in our analyses for both 1991 and 
1995. With the exception of changes in the number of white and black resi-
dents and registration rates in the sample precincts, no significant differences 
from the citywide totals are reflected in our samples. The 1990 census put 
Chicago's population at 2,783,726, a decrease of7.4% since 1980. The racial! 
ethnic breakdown in the city showed the following: 38.6% black, 37.9% white, 
3.6% Asian, 19.6% Hispanic, and 0.3% other race. The fastest growing 
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populations in the city today are Asian and Hispanic. New immigration to the 
city was 7.4%, although the proportions are closer to 8.5% in the sample pre-
cincts. The percentage moving to a different residence since 1985 was 
49.3%. The measure of socioeconomic status-per capita income-was 
$13,605 but is slightly higher in our sample precincts. 
Table 1 also shows political participation rates for municipal elections in 
each year. Citywide voter registration was near 81 % in the first two elections 
held in the 1990s. Registration in our sample precincts is lower than the city-
wide totals-76% in 1991 and 73% in 1995. In the elections of 1991, city-
wide turnout was 47% in the primary election and 45% in the general elec-
tion. Turnout dropped on average in 1995, with 40% participating in the 
primary and 42% in the general election. Turnout rates in our sample pre-
cincts are within 1.5% of the citywide rates for each election. 
ASIAN ETHNIC GROUPS 
To examine the political participation patterns of Asian-Americans and 
newer immigrants in these years, we first performed correlational analyses. 
Table 2 shows correlations between ethnic Asian population groups and 
political participation. In all instances, the effect of the Asian population on 
registration was negative and statistically significant. For example, the corre-
lation between percentage Asian (race variable, including all ethnic groups) 
and percentage registered voters was -.28 in 1991 and -.26 in 1995, each sig-
nificant. Registration was also negatively correlated with each of the ethnic 
population groups. In addition, precincts with larger population shares of 
new immigrants had the strongest negative correlation with registration. This 
reflects the effect that new immigrants can have in lowering registration lev-
els in precincts. Overall, this indicates that precincts with larger Asian popu-
lations and those with more new immigrants will have lower levels of voter 
registration. These findings on registration are consistent with hypothesis 1. 
The relationship between Asian popUlations and turnout was not consis-
tent across groups and election years. Overall, the Asian race variable was 
positive in three of four elections-turnout in both the primary and general 
election of 1991 and the 1995 primary. Only the 1991 results were statisti-
cally significant, showing that higher Asian populations in precincts were 
associated with greater turnout. The Asian race variable did not have a signif-
icant correlation with the 1995 elections. This was not as hypothesized. 
Examining the ethnic group variables shows many different patterns. Pre-
cincts in which the Chinese popUlation was larger had significant positive 
correlations with turnout in each election. This particular finding is consis-




TABLE 2: Asian Ethnic Groups, New Immigrants, and Political Participation: Bivariate Correlations, Chicago, 1990s 
Registration Registration Turnout Turnout Turnout 
Group 1991 1995 Primary 1991 General 1991 Primary 1995 
Asian (all) -.279** -.256** .085** .097** .018 
Chinese -.074** -.093** .116** .116** .079** 
Filipino -.180** -.150** .091 ** .087** -.013 
Indian -.269** -.235** .002 .011 -.022 
Japanese -.138** -.140** -.027 -.006 -.072** 
Korean -.202** -.181** .011 .010 -.016 
Southeast -.169** -.110** -.061 -.031 -.031 
New immigrant -.564** -.453** .122** .131** -.017 
n 2,361 1,968 2,361 2,361 1,968 
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could have a stronger positive relationship with political participation than 
other groups that were more likely to be newer immigrants. Areas with 
greater Filipino populations also had a significant positive relationship to 
turnout-but only in 1991. There were also significant negative correlations: 
Japanese and Southeast Asian for 1995. With the exceptions noted earlier, 
most of these correlations were in the expected direction. We did not expect 
most newer immigrant Asian groups with higher populations in our sample 
precincts to have a positive effect on turnout. 
Perhaps more surprising was the observed relationship between new 
immigration and turnout. Precincts with larger new immigrant populations 
were significantly and positively correlated with turnout in the 1991 elections 
but then negative in the 1995 elections. A clearer understanding of this find-
ing may emer~e from the multivariate analysis that follows. 
UNDERSTANDING VOTER REGISTRATION IN THESE WARDS 
To provide a clearer understanding of the effects of Asian populations and 
other variables on political participation, we conducted a series of regression 
analyses, beginning with voter registration in Table 3. In model 1 for each 
year, raceiethnicity and our socioeconomic status measure, per capita 
income, were the effects being tested. In 1991, all predictors were negative 
and significant in a model that accounted for 23% of the variation in registra-
tion. These results are consistent with the literature on voting and our expec-
tations (hypothesis 2). However, when we add immigration and mobility to 
the equations in model 2, the effects were different. Here we see that immi-
gration and mobility exerted the strongest negative effects on registration. 
But after controlling for their effects, Asian remained a significant and posi-
tive predictor of registration in a model that explained 48% of the variance. 
This shows that Asian populations actually can have an independent and pos-
itive effect on greater precinct-level registration after one controls for two 
factors that reduce political participation-larger shares of the population 
that are more mobile and of newer immigration. 
The 1995 registration models followed a similar pattern to 1991, although 
the level of explained variance was lower. In model 1 for 1995, Asian and 
Hispanic populations had a significant negative effect on registration. But 
after immigration and mobility were introduced to the equations in model 2, 
these new control variables represented the only significant negative predic-
tors. Asian and Hispanic became significant positive predictors of registra-
tion. The net results are that after controlling for immigration and mobility, 
higher Asian (and Hispanic) populations had an independent, positive effect 
on registration levels for 1995. 
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TABLE 3: Voter Registration Models, Chicago Municipal Elections: 1991, 1995 
Modell: Model 2: Modell: Model 2: 
Predictors 1991 1991 1995 1995 
Income per capita ($000) 
b -.004*** -.002*** -.001 ** .000 
Beta -.235 -.144 -.073 .010 
Asian (%) 
b -.595*** .266*** -.552*** .348*** 
Beta -.272 .122 -.234 .148 
Hispanic (%) 
b -.275*** -.019 -.118*** .158*** 
Beta -.406 -.028 -.158 .212 
Black (%) 
b -.018* -.017* .016 .019 
Beta -.052 -.047 .041 .050 
New immigrant (%) 
b -.904*** -1.018*** 
Beta -.487 -.498 
Mobile (%) 
b -.423*** -.377*** 
Beta -.388 -.318 
Intercept .910*** 1.083*** .812*** .966*** 
Adjusted R2 .227 .483 .098 .300 
F-value 174.45** 368.27*** 53.99*** 141.14*** 
n 2,361 2,361 1,968 1,968 
*p::; .05. **p ::; .01. ***p ::; .001. 
These registration models for 1991 and 1995 show significant new find-
ings from previous research on Asian-American participation. The main rea-
son that higher Asian populations reduced registration in precincts was due to 
a high proportion of new immigrants in this group. When one accounts for 
this variable and the frequency with which immigrants will move, Asian pop-
ulations exerted a positive effect that was associated with higher pre-
cinct-level voter registration. 
Political party organization was added to the second model in each year 
(analysis not shown) to determine the effect that it had on registration; in nei-
ther case was it significant. To explore this further, we divided our data set 
into separate groups of precincts based on whether the area was a 
machine-style organization or an independent one. The results of separate 
analyses (not shown) were inconclusive. In 1991, the regression slope coeffi-
cient for Asian had a stronger and significant effect on registration in inde-
pendent precincts (~ = .346) than in machine-style precincts (~ = .202). In 
contrast, the 1995 models showed machine-style wards with a stronger effect 
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TABLE 4: Voter Turnout Models, Chicago Municipal Elections: 1991,1995 
Primary: General: Primary: General: 
Predictors 1991 1991 1995 1995 
Income per capita ($000) 
b -.001 *** -.001*** -.001 *** -.001*** 
Beta -.230 -.265 -.196 -.202 
Asian (%) 
b -.180*** -.221 *** -.113** -.147** 
Beta -.086 -.092 -.055 -.068 
Hispanic (%) 
b -.158*** -.232*** -.163*** -.254*** 
Beta -.243 -.311 -.251 -.371 
Black (%) 
b -.279*** -.348*** -.187*** -.191 *** 
Beta -.820 -.892 -.559 -.543 
Mobility (%) 
b -.317*** -.345*** -.395*** -.420*** 
Beta -.302 -.287 -.383 -.387 
Party organization 
b .004*** .004*** .006*** .006*** 
Beta .136 .103 .193 .207 
Intercept .810*** .860*** .716*** .772*** 
AdjustedR2 .591 .619 .499 .541 
F-value 568.95*** 639.86*** 327.19*** 387.16*** 
n 2,361 2,361 1,968 1,968 
**p:5 .01. ***p:5 .001. 
of Asian on registration in machine-style precincts (~ = .596) than in inde-
pendent ones (~ = .177). Regardless of political party influence, precincts 
with higher Asian populations had positive effects on registration. 
VOTER TURNOUT MODELS 
We developed models of voter turnout for the primary elections of 1991 
and 1995 and the mayoral general elections of the same years. The models 
test the effects of six predictors of turnout: income, Asian, Hispanic, black, 
residential mobility, and political party organization.5 The results of these 
analyses are displayed in Table 4. 
Race/ethnicity, income, and mobility were significant negative predictors 
of voter turnout in each of these elections that chose party candidates for 
mayor, city clerk, and city treasurer and selected city council alderman for 
each ward in nonpartisan elections. Simply stated, each measure reduced 
voter turnout in our models. This was as expected (hypothesis 3). The one 
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consistently positive predictor of turnout is political party organization. Pre-
cincts located in wards with strong Democratic Party organizations had strong-
er turnout in each year. 
In the 1991 elections, Asian population in the precincts had a significant 
negative effect, but its influence in the models-as measured by the standard-
ized beta coefficients-was not as great as the other predictors. Indeed, black 
and Hispanic populations, residential mobility, income, and political party 
organization were more important influences on precinct-level turnout than 
Asian population. The overall model was a good fit for these 1991 elections, 
accounting for 59% of variance in the primary and 62% in the general 
election. 
The final two columns in Table 4 display the results of regressions for the 
1995 elections. Again in these models, the Asian race variable exerted a nega-
tive effect suppressing voter turnout, even after controlling for other factors. 
Although we know that voter turnout can be lower in precincts with larger 
black and Hispanic populations, the model provides support for hypothesis 3 
that areas of high Asian population also experienced lower turnout. Again in 
1995, the Asian predictor's standardized betas were the smallest, indicating 
that compared to other predictors of turnout, Asian population was the weak-
est predictor of turnout in these elections. In fact, other race/ethnicity mea-
sures, income, and residential mobility were stronger negative predictors of 
precinct voter turnout, and the level of Democratic Party organization had a 
positive effect on turnout. The 1995 models were not quite as good of a fit as 
those for 1991, when measured by the smaller adjusted R2 values of 50% for 
the primary and 54% for the general election.6 
The findings of Table 4 point to few differences between precincts with 
greater Asian populations and other raciaVethnic features of precincts. Just as 
larger black and Hispanic popUlations suppressed turnout, so did a larger 
Asian population. These negative effects of race/ethnicity were present even 
after controlling for socioeconomic status and residential mobility. The 
effect of party organization was positive, suggesting that where 
machine-style party organizations were stronger, minority voting may be 
lower. But were racial and ethnic effects any different in precincts with more 
independent political organizing, as stated in hypothesis 4? Do machine-
style organizations suppress minority voting as they maintain their minimum 
winning coalition or preserve political favoritism? To answer these ques-
tions, we conducted separate analyses (not shown here) on precincts with 
machine-style political organizations and precincts with independent 
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political organizations. The separate analyses provided some new insights 
into the effect of parties and Asian populations in Chicago's precincts. 
First, average turnout in the elections was higher in machine-style pre-
cincts than in precincts with independent organizations. In 1991, turnout was 
39% to 42% in independent precincts and 55% to 57% in machine-style pre-
cincts. In 1995, independent precincts averaged 35% to 37% turnout, and the 
machine-style areas showed turnout of 49% to 53%. Higher turnout in the old 
machine organization precincts was consistent with our expectations and the 
thesis that ward leaders want good turnout to ensure good service delivery or 
bureaucratic favoritism. 
Second, whereas Table 4 showed that precincts with higher Asian popula-
tions suppressed voter turnout in the same way as other raciaUethnic minori-
ties populations cause lower turnout, our separate analyses of machine-style 
and independent precincts point to a different conclusion. In the 
machine-style precincts, the results were consistent with Table 4: Higher per-
centages of Asians, Hispanics, and blacks had a negative effect on turnout. 
But when the independent precincts were examined, higher Asian popula-
tions in precincts no longer had a significant negative effect on turnout. 
Indeed, for the 1995 primary, the Asian precinct measure was positive and 
significant; for the 1991 elections and the 1995 general election, the Asian 
predictor was not significant. 
Herein lie some differences in turnout associated with Asian populations 
in precincts. Although the expected negative effect of high Asian populations 
on precinct turnout was apparent in the full model of Table 4, the results were 
closely tied to the continuing impact of the Democratic ward organizations. It 
was in these machine-style precincts that turnout was higher and the 
raciaUethnic minority predictors were negative. Consistent with hypothesis 
4, this suggests that party organizations do not mobilize as well in 
high-minority precincts as they do in others. Furthermore, in areas of less 
party organization influence, the pattern in the regression models differed in 
one key aspect: High Asian populations did not suppress voter turnout. In 
three elections, the Asian predictor was positive, and in one it was negative; 
the one significant effect was a positive effect of the Asian population on 
turnout in the 1995 primary. Hence, after separate analyses of machine-style 
and independent precincts, Asian popUlations stand out from others; their 
impact on precinct-level participation was much less negative and possibly 
even more positive than theories of Asian participation would suggest. These 
findings warrant an alternative explanation. 
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ASIAN PARTICIPATION IN CHICAGO 
Erie's (1988) thesis suggests that the relationship between ethnic groups 
and political organizations is subject to the dictates of the minimal winning 
coalition. After the political party organization had secured the political par-
ticipation of the Irish and other needed groups, there was no incentive to 
mobilize unneeded voters who would make claims on the organization's 
scarce resources. That model has been shown to hold in Chicago and seems to 
have been at work in the 1990s in the areas of the city still under the influence 
of ward-based party organizations. How these organizations have affected 
participation by the growing Asian-American population is seen in a differ-
ent light here, one that shows selective mobilization in Asian-American areas. 
This analysiS of voter registration and turnout in Chicago's municipal 
elections has produced findings that are consistent with some of our expecta-
tions and contrary to others. At the simple bivariate level, precinct measures 
of the relative size of the Asian population and Asian ethnic group popula-
tions displayed several diverging patterns. Whereas areas with greater Asian 
populations correlated negatively with registration, turnout varied by Asian 
ethnic group. The only consistent finding was that greater Chinese-populated 
precincts were more positively associated with turnout. 
Regression models refined our understanding of the relationship between 
the Asian populations and other influences on participation. Precincts with 
higher Asian popUlations had a significant negative influence on registration 
in models that included controls only for race/ethnicity and socioeconomic 
status. But when the registration models were expanded to control for mobil-
ity and immigration, the Asian population variable was significant and posi-
tive. Higher Asian populations actually predicted higher registration, inde-
pendent of immigration status. This finding was not as hypothesized; based 
on earlier research, we expected higher Asian populations to have an inde-
pendent and negative influence on registration, even after controlling for 
other factors. Hence it seems that larger populations of Asians did not reflect 
lower registration (Lien 1994), but larger populations of Asians who were 
newer immigrants and had moved more frequently did lower registration. 
Being a newer immigrant and having less investment in the neighborhood, as 
seen in higher mobility rates, make it less likely that one will register to vote. 
Political party roles were not significant in the registration models. Contrary 
to other findings on Asian participation, the results show that higher Asian 
areas produce more political interest, as measured by higher registration. 
The voter turnout models yielded more consistent results across election 
years. After controlling for socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, and mobility, 
the relative size of the Asian population exerted a significant negative effect 
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on turnout. The larger the Asian population, the lower the precinct's turnout 
rates in the elections. But other factors were more significant predictors in 
each model. This finding was consistent with our hypotheses, as we had 
expected higher Asian populations to significantly reduce turnout rates, even 
after controlling for the influence of other factors. 
Turnout models validated earlier research on lower Asian participation 
patterns-until we separated independent precincts from the machine-style 
ones. Here we saw the real impact of political organizations on Asian-Ameri-
can precincts' participation. Machine-style precincts suppressed participa-
tion. Support for the minimum winning coalition thesis is suggested. The rea-
sons for this are not clear and cannot be sorted out with the precinct-level 
analysis. Perhaps lower turnout in machine-style areas is due to Erie's (1988) 
selective mobilization thesis; perhaps it is due to the political favoritism the-
ory in which party leaders seek to protect their jobs and services from dilution 
from other groups or wards. What is not supported by this research is a rain-
bow coalition thesis, in which participation is stimulated among all minority 
and Asian areas of the city. 
It appears that in Chicago, areas with higher Asian populations have 
higher rates of registration than other raciaVethnic minority groups. This is 
certainly a positive sign of political involvement by a newer immigrant group 
to Chicago and seems to be independent of the organizing activities of the 
Democratic Party. Turnout in areas of higher Asian populations is shaped by 
political organizations. Where vestiges of the old Chicago machine still 
reign, selective mobilization and protection of political favoritism may be the 
motivations for lower turnout. Where more independent political organiza-
tions are at work, turnout rates are lower than in machine-style areas, but the 
level of participation is not suppressed by the presence of larger Asian pop-
ulations. Opportunities for greater political incorporation of Asian popula-
tions in Chicago may have their best opportunities to take root in the more 
fertile political ground of independent political organizations and wards in 
the city. 
NOTES 
1. Chicago's Asian population in 1990: total = 104,118. Ethnic groups in Asian population: 
Filipino = 26.4%, Chinese = 21.4%, Asian Indian = 15.7%, Korean = 13.3%, Southeast Asian = 
8.9%, Japanese = 6.4%, Pacific Islander = 1.1 %, and other Asian = 6.7%. 
2. This is particularly true in the case of the 33rd Ward Regular Democratic Party organiza-
tion. Richard Mell, the committeeman and alderman in that ward, "effectively runs a door-to-
door ward organization as if it were still the 1950s" (Davis 1995, 1). 
3. Data are not available for the 1999 elections. 
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4. The total number of precincts was 2,912 for 1991 and 2,454 for 1995. Because a number 
of precincts had more registered voters than eligible voters as a result of poor maintenance of reg-
istration records by the city of Chicago, we dropped all cases in which the registration figures 
were clearly in error. 
5. Because immigration has a more direct effect on a prior determinant ofvoting-eligibil-
ity to register-and is closely linked to the race variables, it is excluded from this analysis. 
6. The 1995 city elections were the first to be conducted under new ward maps approved by 
voters in a referendum in 1992. In this referendum, it is estimated that the vast majority of Asian 
voters supported the map approved for use in the 1995 election, but only 64% of other voters sup-
ported this (Chicago Urban League 1994, 54). However, the new ward boundaries and precincts 
in effect for the 1995 elections did not increase the Asian turnout from 1991. 
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THE CHANGING FACE 
OF URBAN BUREAUCRACY 
Is There Interethnic Competition 




University of Arkansas 
The authors examine changes overtime in 65 multiethnic U.S. cities to test hypotheses about (1) 
job distribution among ethnic groups and (2) interethnic employment competition. Compared to 
blacks and non-Latino whites, Latinos experience the lowest levels of representation in both 
managerial and nonmanagerial jobs. The authors uncover patterns of competition between 
blacks and Latinos for managerial positions, but the majority of observed competition is between 
traditionally disadvantaged ethnic groups and non-Latino whites. Competition between blacks 
and Latinos for managerial jobs is most likely to occur in departments with redistributive policy 
commitments. The authors find a pervasive pattern of Latino gains and black losses for 
nonmanagerial positions, but they argue that the pattern should not be interpreted as evidence for 
interethnic employment competition. 
As urban environments become more diverse and increasingly multiethnic, 
questions about the distribution of municipal government jobs across ethnic 
groups become more important, and scholars must confront seriously the 
possibility of interethnic competition for these jobs (Hall and Saltzstein 
1975; McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain 1993). McClain (1993) argued 
that increasing tensions between minority groups in many U.S. cities should 
lead urban scholars to direct research attention away from a predominant 
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